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3. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP LAW 
AGENCY LAW 
Pearlie KOH 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (University of Melbourne); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Apparent authority 
The elements 
3.1 The elements that must be present before apparent or ostensible 
authority is made out are not controversial. As the concept is premised 
on estoppel, the principal’s representation, that created the appearance 
of authority of an agent, made to the other contracting party, lies at the 
core of the doctrine. Where the representation does not emanate from 
the principal himself, as would necessarily be the case where 
corporations are concerned, it is of central importance to show that the 
representation was made by a person with the actual authority to make 
such representations. Such persons would include one who has the 
actual authority to manage the business of the principal either generally 
or in respect of the matters to which the impugned contract relates: see 
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964]  
2 QB 480. It is clear therefore that a representation as to his own actual 
authority made by the unauthorised agent himself will not suffice. 
3.2 These points were reiterated by the High Court in Equatorial 
Marine Fuel Management Services Pte Ltd v The Bunga Melati 5 [2010] 
SGHC 193. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant for sums 
allegedly owing under certain contracts for the supply of bunkers to the 
defendant’s vessels. The plaintiff ’s case was that these contracts were 
made on the defendant’s behalf by its alleged agent, MAL. The 
defendant’s case, however, was that it had procured the sale and supply 
of bunkers to its vessels from MAL directly as the contractual seller. The 
plaintiff lacked the evidence to support a case of actual agency and 
sought to rely instead on, inter alia, the evidence of third parties, that the 
employees of the defendant had made representations to them that MAL 
was its agent, to establish a case of apparent authority. 
3.3 The court held that the plaintiff ’s evidence fell far short of that 
required for establishing an agency by estoppel. Not only was there no 
evidence that those employees were authorised to manage the business 
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of the defendant, the representations, if made at all, were not made to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff ’s case was therefore bound to fail. 
The scope of apparent authority 
3.4 Even where it is established that the principal has created, by a 
representation, an appearance of authority that was relied upon by the 
contracting party, the latter can only hold the principal to the contract if 
that contract falls within the scope of the apparent authority. The point 
is illustrated by the decision in United States Trading Co Pte Ltd v Philips 
Electronics Singapore Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 194 (“United States 
Trading”). 
3.5 The plaintiff, United States Trading Co Pte Ltd (“UST”), 
claimed against the defendant, Philips Electronics (“Philips”), for a sum 
of money advanced to the latter purportedly under a contract of loan 
entered into on Philips’ behalf by its agent. UST was a commission agent 
representing Lucky Alloys (“LA”), an aluminium smelter in Dubai. LA 
was one of Philips’ two main suppliers of aluminium. Jason Ting 
(“Ting”) was an employee of Philips who was responsible for the 
purchase of aluminium. He would receive quotations from UST for 
supply of aluminium from LA, orally confirm orders with UST, and 
raise the necessary purchase orders to LA, which were signed by the 
general manager and chief financial officer of Philips. Ting has been 
performing this function for at least four years. In 2006, when the prices 
of aluminium were rising rapidly, Ting requested help from UST to 
partially finance the purchase of an additional quantity of the metal. 
Ting convinced UST that the additional order was urgently required and 
that the financial assistance from UST was required as Philips had 
exhausted its budget for that year as a result of the price increases, and 
Philips’ internal bureaucratic processes would delay the approval 
necessary for a budgetary increase. UST was persuaded to issue a cheque 
on the faith of a written acknowledgment of the loan and an indemnity 
purportedly issued by Philips, as well as a promise that more orders will 
be placed through UST. 
3.6 As it turned out, Philips did not receive the moneys, which were 
in fact misappropriated by Ting as part of a fraudulent scheme. UST 
claimed that Ting, by reason of his appointment as purchasing manager 
as well as UST’s course of dealings with him over the years, had been 
clothed with the necessary authority to enter into a loan contract with 
UST. Lee Seiu Kin J observed (United States Trading at [18]) as follows: 
While the course of dealings particularised could have led [UST] to 
the conclusion that Ting’s authority to enter into purchase contracts 
was deep and wide, I cannot see how this can reasonably lead to the 
conclusion that he could borrow money on [Philips’] behalf, even 
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though the loan was purportedly for the purpose of financing the 
purchase of raw materials. 
3.7 UST’s claim in contract therefore failed. 
Liability to account 
Burden of proof 
3.8 In Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd v Dafni Igal [2010] 
SGCA 45 (“Zim Integrated Shipping”), the Court of Appeal held that, 
where moneys have been received by an agent in the course of its agency 
with the principal, the burden of explaining and justifying the receipt 
and retention of moneys by the agent laid with the agent. 
3.9 Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd (“Zim”) operated a 
container shipping business globally through a network of shipping 
agents, and its operations in Malaysia were facilitated by various agency 
arrangements with, inter alia, Starship Agencies Sdn Bhd (“Starship”),  
a shipping agency incorporated in Malaysia. The present dispute arose 
in connection with the payment of moneys to Starship by the operator 
of Port Klang, which were allegedly incentive rebates made on tariffs 
that had been paid by Zim vis-à-vis the export of containers from Port 
Klang. The moneys, therefore, ought to have been accounted for to Zim. 
3.10 Whilst Zim bore the legal burden of establishing their legal 
entitlement to the moneys received by the agent, the court found that 
Zim had discharged its evidential burden of proving that the moneys 
were received in connection with Starship’s role as Zim’s agent. The 
evidential burden then shifted to the agent, Starship, to demonstrate 
that the moneys had not been so received. Andrew Phang JA observed 
(Zim Integrated Shipping at [12]) as follows: 
[I]t having been proven that payment had been made by a third party 
… to the agent (here, [Starship]), the agent has the burden of 
explaining as well as justifying its receipt and retention of the payment 
concerned. More importantly, perhaps, it could be argued that the 
burden thus placed on the fiduciary … is not merely an evidential one 
but a legal one. [Starship] had the burden of proving that full 
disclosure was made to [Zim], and that their consent was subsequently 
given. [emphasis in original] 
3.11 As Starship had failed to discharge the burden of proof placed 
on it, it was liable to account to Zim for the moneys received. 
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PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Stephen BULL 
BA, LLB (Hons) (Wellington), LLM (Harvard); 
Solicitor (England and Wales), Barrister and Solicitor (New Zealand), 
Member of the New York Bar; 
Practice Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management 
University. 
Relationship of partners to third parties 
3.12 There was only one significant partnership law case in 2010. In 
Lim Hsi-Wei Marc v Orix Capital [2010] 3 SLR 1189 (“Lim Hsi-Wei”), 
the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the High Court in Orix 
Capital Ltd v Personal Representative(s) of the Estate of Lim Chor Pee, 
deceased [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1062 (noted in (2009) 10 SAL Ann Rev 48). 
The appeal judgment is an important decision on the scope of the 
ostensible authority of a partner under s 5 of the Partnership Act 
(Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “Act”) and also the application of s 36 of 
the Act to “salaried” partners. The basic facts were as follows. Chor Pee 
& Partners (“CP&P”) was a law firm comprising Lim Chor Pee (“LCP”) 
and two salaried partners, Marc Lim (“Marc”) (LCP’s son) and Rebecca 
Yeo (“Rebecca”). The firm took a lease of Canon photocopiers from 
Orix Capital (“Orix”) in July 2004 (“the Lease”). The Lease was in 
substitution for an existing copier lease from another company, 
Newcourt; as a result, a large early-termination payment would be 
triggered under the Newcourt lease. Under a four-way deal, Canon paid 
off the early-termination payment to Newcourt, that payment being 
reimbursed by Orix to Canon and, in effect, added to the sums payable 
by the firm under the Lease. The latter was signed by LCP and Marc; it 
also named, but was not signed by, Rebecca. In July 2005, the firm 
defaulted on rental payments, and Orix gave notice of termination of 
the Lease. In August 2005, following a request by LCP, Orix wrote to the 
firm offering to “reinstate” the Lease on condition of payment of the 
arrears and certain other amounts. The firm’s payment of those sums in 
August thus re-established the contractual relationship. However, it was 
later held by the High Court (and not challenged on appeal) that the 
agreement in August 2005 (the “August Agreement”) was in law a new 
contract rather than a revival of the Lease. Following LCP’s death in 
December 2006, a further rental default occurred. Orix then terminated 
the agreement and brought proceedings for non-payment against LCP’s 
estate, which admitted liability, and against Marc and Rebecca, who 
both denied it. 
3.13 Marc argued, inter alia, that the August Agreement was not 
binding on him because entering it had exceeded LCP’s authority as a 
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partner. The High Court disagreed and held him liable. Rebecca, who 
had stepped down to employee status in April 2005 and left the firm 
altogether by the end of July 2005, additionally argued that she had 
ceased to be a partner before the August Agreement was entered and so 
could not be bound by it. The High Court upheld this defence. The 
Court of Appeal allowed Marc’s appeal but dismissed Orix’s appeal in 
Rebecca’s case. Accordingly, Orix ultimately failed against both of the 
salaried partners. 
3.14 The main issue addressed by the Court of Appeal was whether 
LCP had had authority to enter the Lease and (more importantly) the 
August Agreement under s 5 of the Act. The second limb of that section 
states that a firm is bound by a partner’s acts done for “carrying on in 
the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm”. Analysing 
that limb in terms of ostensible authority, the court stated that it 
required that a contract both fell within the usual nature of the firm’s 
business and had been entered in a usual manner for such business. 
These questions are to be considered from the viewpoint of a reasonably 
careful and competent person of the same kind as the third party. The 
onus of proof in both issues is on the third party. What is usual is 
ultimately a question of fact, but the court identified certain kinds of 
transaction which have typically been held to be either usual  
(eg, purchasing goods) or unusual (eg, giving a guarantee). In this 
connection, the court reaffirmed the distinction drawn historically 
between “trading” and “non-trading” partnerships, the former normally 
being defined as those which buy and sell goods. Partners of trading 
firms have traditionally been held to have wider ostensible authority, 
including the authority to borrow money, in view of the dependence of 
such firms on credit. As law firms were not trading firms, partners did 
not have ostensible authority to borrow. Nor, the court held, did they 
have power to compromise a claim against the firm in a manner which 
may prejudice the other partners: Lim Hsi-Wei at [36]–[42]. 
3.15 In applying these principles, the Court of Appeal characterised 
the Lease as a composite “loan-cum-lease” transaction. The inclusion of 
an amount equivalent to the Newcourt early-termination payment, as 
shown by the total facility amount under the Lease being several times 
the value of the leased copiers, meant that the transaction in substance 
involved significant borrowings by CP&P. The court held that Orix must 
have known of the firm’s cash-flow problems under the Newcourt lease 
and that the Lease, while reducing its short-term cash-flow 
requirements, could only increase its overall financial burden. While a 
“typical straightforward” equipment lease may have been usual, the fact 
that the Lease contained a very substantial borrowing element – of 
which Orix must have been aware – that took it outside the s 5 
ostensible authority of a law firm partner. Moreover, even viewed as a 
“plain vanilla” lease transaction, the court held that the Lease seemed to 
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have been entered in an unusual way. There were other features of the 
transaction known to Orix which were “peculiar”, eg, a single default 
would accelerate the whole amount due under the Lease. Orix had not 
discharged its burden of demonstrating that the Lease transaction was 
usual so as to come within s 5, and no other kind of authority had been 
shown: Lim Hsi-Wei at [53]–[57]. 
3.16 Similar considerations applied to the August Agreement which 
had replaced the Lease and which (unlike the Lease) had not been 
assented to by Marc. In addition, the court held that “as a matter of 
general principle, once a substantial claim had been made against a 
partnership, in the absence of specific provisions in the partnership 
agreement, the express consent of the partners would have to be sought 
to resolve the claim if this would prejudice them in any way”: Lim Hsi-
Wei at [62]. This is because the relationship had become adversarial: it 
was no longer business as usual. The August Agreement represented a 
settlement of the claim made by Orix when it terminated the Lease in 
July 2005. Orix, therefore, ought to have ensured that all three partners 
to whom the claim was addressed had consented to the new agreement. 
(However, the court did not go on to indicate how the August 
Agreement might have prejudiced Mark’s position given that it was on 
virtually the same terms as the Lease on which he was undoubtedly 
liable as a signatory.) 
3.17 The court’s conclusion that LCP did not have authority to enter 
the August Agreement meant that even true partners in the firm, had 
there been any, would not have been liable on it. It was, therefore, 
unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to consider the further issues of  
(a) whether the two salaried partners had been held out as partners 
under s 14 of the Act (which is the foundation of a salaried partner’s 
liability), and (b) if so, whether Rebecca’s retirement before entry into 
the August Agreement absolved her of liability. However, the Court of 
Appeal did analyse the issue in (b) and reach the same conclusion as the 
High Court (see para 3.18 below). Further, the Court of Appeal made 
some obiter comments on the issue in (a) but without reaching a 
final conclusion (for discussion of the latter comments, see (2011)  
23 SAcLJ 323). 
3.18 Partners are prima facie liable only for obligations incurred by 
the firm while they were partners. By way of exception, s 36 of the Act 
has the effect that a liability incurred by a firm to a third party after the 
retirement of a partner will bind the retired partner if the third party  
(i) had known him to be a partner before his retirement and (ii) had not 
had notice of the retirement at the time when the liability was incurred: 
Tower Cabinet Co Ltd v Ingram [1949] 2 KB 397. As both of these 
elements were satisfied in relation to Rebecca, Orix argued that she was 
liable on the August Agreement despite her earlier retirement. The 
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Court of Appeal stated that s 36 could indeed apply to salaried partners 
as well as true partners, so long as the salaried partner had been held out 
to and relied on by the third party (pursuant to s 14 of the Act). 
However, the court went on to opine that s 36 liability was limited to 
liabilities incurred under pre-retirement contracts, and so did not apply 
to the August Agreement in Rebecca’s case. The court’s reasoning was 
that, by retiring from the firm, an ex-partner terminates his co-partners’ 
authority to continue concluding agreements that would bind him:  
Lim Hsi-Wei at [71]–[73]. However, with respect, this reasoning 
arguably places undue emphasis on actual authority; whereas s 36 is, as 
the court recognised, founded on the underlying premise of estoppel. 
Authority established under estoppel principles is based on an 
impression created in the third party’s mind as to the agent’s authority, 
and in principle continues until such impression has been dispelled, in 
particular by notice of revocation of the authority: see SEB Trygg Liv AB v 
Manches [2006] 1 WLR 2276 at [32]. Although Rebecca had retired, 
there was no indication in the facts that this had been brought to Orix’s 
attention before the formation of the August Agreement. 
